Report on the security incident of 6 November
- On 6 November 2026 one of our cloud services was attacked. The attacker chained several vulnerabilities together — in PowerFolder Server and in our own infrastructure. No single gap would have been enough.
- The attack lasted about 90 minutes, just under 30 of them with administrator rights. What the attacker read and tried to write is traceable in detail from our logs.
- He wrote exactly one setting, which never took effect. We found no change to our source code or to our software delivery.
- Your stored files are not affected. We treat the profile data of cloud users as compromised: name, email address and the encrypted password. The files in the folders themselves were neither read nor changed nor deleted by the attacker.
- If you use PowerFolder Cloud: set a new password through “Forgot password” on my.powerfolder.com and sign in again. There is no update for you to install — the cloud already runs the current build.
- If you run your own server: install 28.2.101 or 26.4.101 if you have not already. If you run .100, replacing the program file is enough.
We deliberately leave out details of our own infrastructure. The criminal investigation is ongoing.
How the attack unfolded
- Preparation: using passwords from unrelated data breaches, the attacker took over individual user accounts on my.powerfolder.com and scanned our infrastructure for entry points.
- Entry: a vulnerability in our own document server for online editing could be misused to relay requests. Through the online document editing interface (
/wopi/) the attacker could then read system files from our servers without signing in — configurations holding credentials, no user files. - Administrator rights: in a backup he found an administrator session that was still active and used it to take over admin access to a cloud server. PowerFolder stores passwords encrypted; they could not be read.
- Stopped: he could not start programs, because our servers are deliberately hardened against it. That is what held the attack at the decisive point. Shortly afterwards we detected it and isolated the systems.
Every credential the attacker was able to read has been replaced.
Impact
- PowerFolder Drive and my.powerfolder.com: the attacker was able to read configuration files and credentials. Because database backups were reachable as well, we treat the profile data of all cloud users as compromised as a precaution and have informed every user. The data protection authority is involved. The forensic analysis is largely complete; the course of the attack is coherently traceable.
- Profile data yes, user files no. Name, email address and the encrypted password are compromised. The attacker did not get to the files in the folders: that would have required starting a program, and that is exactly where he failed.
- Individual user accounts were taken over with passwords from unrelated breaches. We locked those accounts and notified their owners.
- Self-hosted servers: all versions were vulnerable. After our warning, every operator known to us blocked
/wopi/or took their systems off the network. - Source code and delivery: checked, no manipulation found. The published installation packages are signed and come with checksums.
What cloud users should do now
- Set a new password through “Forgot password” on my.powerfolder.com. We have reset the previous passwords.
- Sign in again on all your devices afterwards. We have ended every existing session.
- If you use the same password with other services, change it there too. The attack started with passwords from unrelated data breaches.
- Set up two-factor sign-in if you have not already.
There is no update for you to install: PowerFolder Cloud already runs the current build. The steps below apply only to operators running their own server.
What server operators should do now
- Install 28.2.101 or 26.4.101 and verify the SHA-256 checksum. Downloads and install steps are in the announcement of 12 November.
- Keep the block on
/wopiin place until you have updated. The rule must also reject/wopi;/…. - Set up two-factor sign-in for all administrators.
- With SAML sign-in, set
net.trusted.proxiesto the addresses of your reverse proxies. - Search your logs for requests to
/wopifrom unfamiliar networks and report anything unusual.
What we learned
- Every interface is checked on its own. We work on a zero-trust principle: a request is not trustworthy just because it comes from the internal network. The attacker got through a vulnerability, not through trust that had been granted. That is why we are now going through every single interface again — with signed tokens and strict path validation.
- Hardening works. That the server cannot start programs was a deliberate decision — and it stopped the attack. We are extending that stance.
- Admin access is the most valuable target. Two-factor sign-in has always been mandatory for us internally; with this update it applies to administrators on our customers' servers as well. Sessions are bound to the device, and we are removing credentials from logs and support bundles.
- Communicating openly works. We reached every operator through support within a day. Because the blocks went up that fast, no further systems were open to the attacker. We are standardising that route so a warning reaches everyone in one step.
What happens next
- Investigation and authorities: we have filed a criminal complaint. The public prosecutor's office is leading the case, the police are investigating, and we continue to assist. The reports to the BSI and the data protection authority (LDI NRW) are under way.
- CVE identifiers: the vulnerabilities will be published in coordination with the BSI. We will add the identifiers here.
- There were further attempts after the update. The last one documented to us is from 11 November and failed. Unpatched installations remain the greatest risk.
Thank you for your patience and your quick help: many of you put the blocks in place the same day, sent us logs and tested the update early. As soon as the investigation produces findings relevant to you, we will add them here. For questions please use support.powerfolder.com.